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Jeffry A. Frieden, Political Science and SIPA
Governments increasingly use economic policies to attempt to coerce other governments, in both economic and non-economic realms. The evolution of American policy in this regard is most striking, especially as targets have included both traditional adversaries and traditional allies. Governments increase their bargaining power by using economic policies for geopolitical purposes. However, such “geoeconomic” policies also have costs. They can limit the efficient functioning of the economy, reducing the incentives to specialize and maximize national productive efficiency. They can diminish the incentive of firms to innovate, and stimulate innovative activity by foreign competitors. They may damage the reputation of the country, and of its firms and citizens, for reliability in their interactions. And they may harm some industries, firms, groups, or people in the sending nation in favor of others, in ways that may be politically controversial. The benefits of geoeconomic policies may clearly outweigh the costs. Nonetheless, we need a clear sense of what those costs are to form a considered opinion about whether the net benefits are positive.
Keywords: geopolitics, trade policy, coercion, diplomacy, geoeconomics
Working Papers
2026
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